Islamabad: In 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implemented safeguards for 190 States with active safeguards agreements, as outlined in the recently published Safeguards Statement and Background for 2024. The comprehensive effort involved over 3000 in-field verification activities across more than 1300 nuclear facilities and locations worldwide.
According to EMM, the IAEA’s safeguards verify States’ commitments to using nuclear material and technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. The annual Safeguards Statement details the IAEA’s findings and conclusions from its nuclear verification activities throughout the year. The 2024 report highlights a continuing trend from previous years, with the amount of nuclear material and facilities under IAEA safeguards on the rise. Massimo Aparo, Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards at the IAEA, noted that as more countries seek to incorporate nuclear power into their energy mix, the agency’s workload will inevitably increase.
In a significant development for 2024, several countries, including the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Fiji, Mongolia, Oman, and Sierra Leone, amended their original Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs) to align with the revised standard text. Saudi Arabia rescinded its SQP. The IAEA remains prepared to assist the 15 States with SQPs based on the original text in amending or rescinding these protocols. Additionally, a comprehensive safeguards agreement with a revised SQP text and an additional protocol entered into force for Timor-Leste, enhancing IAEA’s verification capabilities.
The IAEA’s conclusions for 2024, drawn from 190 States where safeguards were applied, indicate that 182 States had comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) in force. Among these, 137 States also had additional protocols (APs) in force, with the IAEA confirming that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities for 75 of these States. Notably, Morocco received this broader conclusion for the first time. For 61 States, ongoing evaluations regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities limited the conclusions to declared nuclear material.
For 31 States with a CSA but no AP in force, the IAEA could only confirm that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. However, three non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had yet to bring CSAs into force, preventing the IAEA from drawing any safeguards conclusions for these States.
In India, Israel, and Pakistan, where the IAEA implemented item-specific safeguards agreements, the agency concluded that nuclear material and facilities remained in peaceful activities. In the five nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT, the IAEA confirmed that nuclear material in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as outlined in their agreements.
Massimo Aparo emphasized the importance of member state support in meeting the challenges of international nuclear safeguards implementation. The IAEA continues to bolster the capacity of States and regional authorities responsible for safeguards implementation through extensive training opportunities.
In 2024, the IAEA launched a new cycle of the Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSACs) and State or regional authorities responsible for safeguards implementation (SRAs), known as COMPASS. This initiative, launched in 2020, provides tailored assistance to address specific safeguards needs, with Bangladesh, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cameroon, and Ghana participating in the latest cycle.